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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Customs Law-Countervailing Duties--Nonexcessive Remission of Ex-
cise Tax by Japanese Government Is Not a Bounty or Grant Within
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as Amended by 19 U.S.C. § 1303
(Supp. V 1975).-On April 3, 1970, Zenith Radio Corporation, an American
manufacturer of various consumer electronic products, filed a petition with
the Commissioner of Customs' alleging that the Japanese Government was
subsidizing, directly or indirectly, the manufacture or production of certain
consumer electronic products2 made in Japan and subsequently exported into
the United States. 3 The Japanese Government imposed a single-stage con-
sumption tax on a fairly extensive list of goods similar to those manufactured
by Zenith. Upon exportation from Japan, the products were either exempted
from the consumption tax, or if it had already been paid, the tax was
remitted. 4 Zenith alleged that such tax remissions constituted bounties or
grants in violation of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 in its presently
amended form. 5 After publication of a Notice of Countervailing Duty Pro-
1. The petition was filed pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 16.24(b) (1970): "Any person outside the
Customs Service who has reason to believe that any bounty or grant is being paid or bestowed
with respect to dutiable merchandise imported into the United States may communicate his belief
to any appraiser or the Commissioner of Customs. Every such communication shall contain, or be
accompanied by, (1) a full statement of the reasons for the belief. (2) a detailed description or
sample of the merchandise, (3) all pertinent facts obtainable as to any bounty or grant being paid
or bestowed with respect to such merchandise." This provision was subsequently amended and
recodified without significant change, and now appears at 19 C.FR. § 159.47(b)(1) (1977).
2. The products at issue included "[t]elevision receivers, radio receivers, radio-phonograph
combinations, radio-television-phonograph combinations, radio-tape recorder combinations, rec-
ord players and phonographs complete with amplifiers and speakers, tape recorders, tape
players, and color television picture tubes." Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp.
242, 242 n.2 (Cust. CL), rev'd, 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 6 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
3. Zenith has been involved in a significant number of cases in an attempt to nullify what it
deems to be the adverse effects upon domestic industry in the United States of foreign trade
practices: Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, rehearing denied, 401
U.S. 1015 (1970) (Sherman and Clayton Acts); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 'Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100 (1969) (patent law and Sherman Act); Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 404 F. Supp. 547 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd, 548 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1977) (patent law); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Clayton Act);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 402 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed,
521 F.2d 1399 (3rd Cir. 1975) (Antidumping Act).
4. 430 F. Supp. at 243.
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(aXl) (Supp. V 1975) (amending Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat.
590, 687). The present law, in pertinent part, states: "Whenever any country, dependency,
colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership, association,
cartel, or corporation, shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the
manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in
such country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, then
upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the United States, whether the same
shall be imported directly from the country of production or otherwise, and whether such article
or merchandise is imported in the same condition as when exported from the country of
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ceeding, 6 and upon completion of an investigation of the merits, 7 the Assis-
tant Secretary of the Treasury approved, 8 and the Commissioner of Customs
caused to be published, a Notice of Preliminary Determination which held
that three specific Japanese programs, 9 none of which encompassed the tax
remission at issue, constituted bounties or grants within the meaning of
section 303 of the Tariff Act.' 0 Further, benefits from these programs were
deemed, both separately and in the aggregate, to be de minimis."1 An
amendment to the Notice of Preliminary Determination added a general
catch-all paragraph which provided:
Any other programs alleged to result in the payment or bestowal of a bounty or grant
within the meaning of section 303 of the Act have been terminated by the Japanese
production or has been changed in condition by remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied
and paid, in all such cases, in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net
amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed." Id.
6. 19 C.F.R. § 16.24(d) (1972) provides: "Upon receipt by the Commissioner of Customs of
any communication submitted pursuant to paragraph (a), (b), or (c), of this section and found to
comply with the requirements of the pertinent paragraph the Commissioner will cause such
investigation to be made as appears to be warranted by the circumstances of the case. If he
determines that the information presented in such communication is patently In error, he shall so
advise the person who submitted the information and the case shall be closed. Otherwise, the
Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall publish a notice In the
Federal Register that a communication has been submitted pursuant to paragraph (a), (b), or (c)
of this section. The notice shall invite interested persons to submit written comments with respect
to the matter within such time as is specified in the notice." The pertinent material now appears,
in substantially the same form, in 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(c) (1977).
In this case, notice was approved by an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury on May 17, 1972.
37 Fed. Reg. 10,087, as amended by 37 Fed. Reg. 11,487 (1972). The Notice stated that
"[i]nformation has been received ...which raises a question as to whether certain payments,
bestowals, rebates, or refunds granted by the Government of Japan upon the manufacture,
production, or exportation of certain consumer electronic products constitute the payment or
bestowal of a bounty or grant, directly or indirectly, within the meaning of section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, upon the manufacture, production, or exportation of the merchandise to
which the payments, bestowals, rebates or refunds apply." Id. at 10,087 (citations omitted).
7. This investigation was conducted pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 16.24(d) (1972) (now 19 C.F.R.
§ 159.47(c) (1977)). See note 6 supra.
8. The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury so approved on January 30, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg.
5,378 (1975).
9. The three specific Japanese programs investigated by the Treasury Department consisted
of "[1] preferential interest rate loans from the Japanese Development Bank, [21 promotional
assistance from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), and [3] tax deferrals under the
Overseas Market Development Reserve." Id. Since the Overseas Market Development Reserve
program is available only to those Japanese firms capitalized at less than one billion yen,
significant benefits from the program could conceivably be reaped only by smaller exporting
firms. The Commissioner of Customs, in order to safeguard against any eventual receipt of such
significant benefits, required -reports from Japanese firms eligible for tax deferrals under the
Overseas Market Development Reserve program to ascertain whether and to what extent they
benefited from the program. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Government and/or are preliminarily determined not to result in the payment or
bestowal of a bounty or grant.'
2
The tax remission on Japanese electronic products imported into the United
States was covered by this paragraph.
The Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, as approved by
the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, 13 was published by the Commissioner of
Customs 14 on January 7, 1976. The Final Determination repeated the finding
of the amended Notice of Preliminary Determination and concluded that no
bounty or grant under section 303 was being paid or bestowed by the
Japanese Government upon the manufacture, production, or exportation of
the Japanese electronic products.' s Thereupon Zenith served timely notice of
its desire to contest the findings contained in the Final Determination., 6 The
12. 40 Fed. Reg. 19,853 (1975).
13. The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury so approved on December 31, 1975. 41
Fed. Reg. 1,298 (1976).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (Supp. V 1975) provides: "within 30 days after a determination by the
Secretary... (2) under section 1303 of this title, that a bounty or grant is not being paid or
bestowed, an American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler of merchandise of the same class
or kind as that described in such determination may file with the Secretary a written notice of a
desire to contest such determination. Upon receipt of such notice the Secretary shall cause
publication to be made thereof and of such manufacturer's, producer's, or wholesaler's desire to
contest the determination. Within 30 days after such publication, such manufacturer, producer,
or wholesaler may commence an action in the United States Customs Court contesting such
determination."
Section 1516 was the legislative reaction to the decision in United States v. Hammond Lead
Prods., Inc., 306 F. Supp. 460 (Cust. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 440 F.2d 1024
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). In Hammond, the Customs Court reversed a
Treasury Decision to refrain from imposing countervailing duties against Mexican exports of
litharge, a lead oxide. T.D. 67-142, 1 Cust. B. & Dec. 292 (1967). At the time, Mexico had a
surplus of lead and a currency situation that made exports inexpensive. It consequently increased
its export taxes on lead to protect its domestic supply of that resource, while offering it for
domestic consumption far below the world price. Since no excise tax was imposed on litharge
exports, and since Mexican litharge producers could obtain lead at less than the world price,
litharge could be exported to the United States at a competitive advantage. The Customs Court
held that this situation constituted a bounty or grant within the meaning of § 303 of the Tariff Act
of 1930. 306 F. Supp. at 465-71. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) reversed
without reaching the issue, because it determined that the United States customs courts were
without jurisdiction to review negative countervailing duty determinations at the request of
an American. 440 F.2d at 1027. The ironic result of Hammond was that United States customs
courts could review a negative countervailing duty determination when it was challenged by an
foreign importer, but could not similarly respond to a challenge presented by an American
manufacturer or producer. Comment, United States Countervailing Duty Law: Renewed, Re-
vamped and Revisited-Trade Act of 1974, 17 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 832, 845 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Countervailing Duty Law]. "In the absence of such a right to review, the
mandatory nature of section 303 and its remedial impact were largely illusory . I..." d. In
response to Hammond, Congress enacted a special provision in the Trade Act of 1974 to provide
for review of negative countervailing duty determinations. Trade Act of 1974, ch. 3, § 331(a), 88
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Assistant Secretary of the Treasury published the notice and announced
Zenith's desire to contest the Final Determination. 17 Trial ensued in the
Customs Court.'8
A three-judge panel' 9 unanimously granted Zenith's motion for summary
judgment. The Court further ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to
determine or estimate the net amounts of bounties or grants paid by the
Japanese Government and to order the appropriate customs officials through-
out the United States to assess countervailing duties equal to such bounty or
grant. 20 It is to be noted that the Customs Court decided Zenith as a matter
of law. 2 ' A sharply divided 22 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.
A.) reversed the decision of the Customs Court and held that the Japanese
Commodity Tax Law did not provide for the payment or bestowal of a
bounty or grant within the meaning of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 6
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
It is a truism that the practice of encouraging commercial exports can be
achieved through governmental subsidies to the production, manufacture or
exportation of domestic goods. It is equally evident that such practice poses a
serious threat to the natural and most efficient allocation of resources in
international trade. As early as 1776, Adam Smith condemned such artificial
governmental stimulation in his treatise Wealth of Nations,23 stating that "the
effect of bounties, like that of all other expedients of the mercantile system,
can only be to force the trade of a country into a channel much less
advantageous than that in which it would naturally run of its own accord."
24
In order to protect the "natural channels" of international trade and to protect
American industry, Congress, since 1890, has enacted countervailing duty
schemes. 25 These statutes have provided for the imposition of countervailing
Stat. 1978, 2049-52. See generally American Manufacturers Contest of Treasury Decision Not To
Assess Countervailing or Anti-Dumping Duties, Third Annual Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 72 F.R.D. 239, 397-441 (1976); see also notes 39-43
infra and accompanying text.
17. 41 Fed. Reg. 10,235 (1976).
18. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977).
19. The three-judge panel in this case was designated by the chief judge of the Customs Court
upon defendant's application pursuant to § 108 of the Customs Courts Act of 1970, which
provides: "Upon application of any party to a civil action . . . the chief judge of the Customs
Court shall designate any three judges of the court to hear and determine any civil action which
the chief judge finds . . . has broad or significant implications in the administration or
interpretation of the customs laws." 28 U.S.C. § 225(a) (1970).
20. 430 F. Supp. at 265.
21. Id.
22. The C.C.P.A. rendered a 3-2 decision.
23. 2 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 8 (6th ed.
London 1896).
24. Id.
25. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687, as amended by Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. V 1975); Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858, 935-36; Tariff Act
of 1913, ch. 16, § IV, para. E, 38 Stat. 114, 193-94; Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 6, 36 Stat. 11, 85;
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duties upon goods exported into the United States in an amount equal to the
"'net amount" of subsidies received from a foreign government by a manufac-
turer for the exportation of those goods. 26 The rationale of the countervailing
duty laws in the United States is to reestablish the "natural channels" of
international economic trade. 27 The Tariff Acts of 189028 and 189429 were the
earliest enactments of a countervailing duty scheme in the United States.
These statutes dealt specifically with the importation of sugar and contained
special provisos whereby the foreign exporter of sugar would not be obliged to
pay a countervailing duty if it could prove that the subsidization or "bounty"
it received from the foreign government did not exceed the quantum of tax
collected by that government upon the beet or sugar from which the sugar
was produced.30 With the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1897, 3 1 Congress
expanded the scope of the countervailing duty provisions to include all
dutiable products and any bounty or grant, direct or indirect, regardless of the
method of bestowal. 3 2 Under this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury was
directed to impose countervailing duties at a level equal to the "net amount"
of any bounty or grant found to have been given. 3 3
Congress reenacted, without significant alteration, the provisions of the
1897 statute in 190934 and again in 1913. 3- In 1922, Congress extended the
scope of the statute to afford similar treatment to bounties or grants on the
manufacture or production, as well as on the exportation, of all dutiable
foreign products, whether or not such bounties or grants were derived from
governmental or private sources. 36 Notwithstanding this statutory revision,
the Treasury Department's administrative policy was to impose countervail-
ing duties exclusively against benefits designed as artificial stimulants to
exportation; by refraining from countervailing against bounties or grants upon
either manufacture or production, the Treasury Department was able to avoid
imprudently interfering with programs designed by foreign governments to
have solely domestic ramifications. 37 Under section 303 of the Tariff Act of
Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205; Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, sched. E. para.
182 , 28 Stat. 509, 521; Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 567, 584.
26. See sources cited note 25 supra.
27. Countervailing Duty Law, supra note 16, at 868.
28. Ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 567, 584.
29. Ch. 349, sched. E, para. 182 , 28 Stat. 509, 521.
30. See sources cited notes 28-29 supra.
31. Ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Ch. 6, § 6, 36 Stat. 11, 85. This statute added the phrase "province or other political
subdivision," thus extending the statute's reach to bounties or grants provided from these sources.
Id.
35. Ch. 16, § IV, para. E, 38 Stat. 114, 193-94.
36. Ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858, 935-36.
37. Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjust-
ments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, 1 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 17, 27
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Mutiny.] "One can readily imagine that countervailing on the basis of
a production subsidy might be viewed as interference in the domestic affairs of the exporting
country, particularly if the production subsidies neither yield an appreciable increase in exports,
1977]
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1930, the antecedent provisions were repeated. 31 However, in 1974, the Tariff
Act of 1930 was amended 39 in three principle ways:40 first, by fixing time
limits for Treasury Department action on complaints; 4 1 second, by expanding
the remedy to duty-free products; 42 and third, by providing for judicial
review of determinations denying relief to domestic complainants. 43 These
amendments significantly strengthened the existing countervailing duty provi-
sions against imports into the United States which had benefited from foreign
subsidization.44
Viewed in its proper perspective, the concept of a countervailing duty was
engendered by the "dominant protectionist" posture assumed by Congress in
1897. 4 5 In essence, Congress sought to insure that foreign and domestic
products would compete in the American market according to their relative
merits, without the benefit of artificial price reductions made possible by the
receipt of government bounties or grants. 4 6 Unfortunately, no Congress has
nor were intended to do so." Id. at 64. See also King, Countervailing Duties-An Old Remedy
with New Appeal, 24 Bus. Law. 1179, 1181 (1969) [hereinafter cited as King].
38. Ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687. Upon a showing by a domestic industry that a foreign
commodity has received a bounty or grant, the Secretary of the Treasury is ordered either to
ascertain or to estimate the net amount of such foreign subsidy and to impose countervailing
duties equal to such amount. Id.
39. Ch. 3, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 1978, 2049-52, originally proposed as the Trade Reform Act of
1973, 119 Cong. Rec. 11,691, 11,691-95 (1975).
40. Silbiger, Trade Act of 1974: New Remedies Against Unfair Trade Practices in Intera-
tional Trade, 5 Den. J. Int'l & Pol'y 77, 101 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Silbiger.
41. Congress "has amended section 303(a) to require a six-month maximum time limit for
preliminary determination and a twelve-month maximum time limit for a final determination
beginning on the date of filing of a petition setting forth a belief that a bounty or grant is being
paid or bestowed, or, in the absence of such a petition, from the date of publication of a notice of
initiation of an investigation." S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1974), reprinted in
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7186, 7319.
42. The Act has the effect of expanding the scope of the countervailing duty law to include
duty-free articles. "Under this provision, no additional duty could be imposed with respect to any
duty-free article unless there is a determination by the International Trade Commission... that a
domestic producer of like or directly competitive articles is being or is likely to be injured, or is
prevented from being established by reason of importation of such article." S. Rep. No. 93-1298,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 184, 185 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7186,
7320. It should be noted that § 303, which was at issue in the Zenith case, did not require such a
determination because the articles involved therein were dutiable. See 19 U.S.C. § 1202, Tariff
Sched. 6, part 5, items 684.70-685.50 (1970).
43. The Act provides to American manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers, "so as to assure
effective protection under the countervailing duty laws. . . the right to judicial review of negative
countervailing duty determinations by the Secretary of the Treasury." S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 184, 185 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7186, 7320.
See note 16 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Hammond, the decision of the
C.C.P.A. which prompted this provision of the Act.
44. Silbiger, supra note 40, at 101.
45. Mutiny, supra note 37, at 21-22. While the congressional posture of 1897 can indeed be
termed "protectionist," it should be noted that the countervailing duty provisions of the United
States only seek to reestablish the "natural channels" of world trade.
46. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
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defined the concept of "bounty or grant" since the countervailing duty
provisions were originally enacted. This omission has forced the courts to
interpret, and indeed define, these terms.
While the majority for the C.C.P.A. considered Zenith to be a case of first
impression and thus distinguished the authority cited by respondent, 47 the
dissent in the C.C.P.A.48 and the unanimous Customs Court 9 felt that the
issue in Zenith was governed by long-standing precedents which interpreted
the countervailing duty law in force at the time. s ° The earliest case relied
upon by the dissent and the Customs Court was United States v. Passavant. s I
Passavant did not require the interpretation of a countervailing duty statute.
Instead it focused on whether the quantum of remission of an excise tax
imposed on certain cotton velvet goods by the German Government should be
included in the "actual value" of such goods for purposes of levying United
States customs duties. In relation to Zenith, Passavant should be persuasive
in that it entailed a determination, under the United States customs laws,s2
that remitted foreign excise taxes will not be ignored when American courts
interpret the customs laws. The German tax remission scheme specifically
provided that an ad valorem tax, levied on certain cotton velvet goods at the
time of their sale by the manufacturer, was to be remitted by the German
Government under the rubric "bonification of tax"S3 if such goods were
purchased in bond, or consigned in bond, for exportation to a foreign
country.5 4 The Court noted that the purpose of the remission was "to
encourage exportation and the introduction of German goods into other
markets." s s In holding that the quantum of remitted tax should be included in
the dutiable "actual market value," the Court established the principle that
internal taxing procedures of foreign governments, their purposes, and their
effect on American customs practices will be closely scrutinized S6
The first landmark countervailing duty decision, and the case upon which
the unanimous Customs Court and the dissent in the C.C.P.A. relied heavily,
was Downs v. United States.S 7 Downs involved the applicability of the Tariff
Act of 1897s 8 to a complicated scheme devised by the Russian Government to
47. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 6, 14 (C.C.P.A.
1977).
48. Id. at 28-33 (Miller, J., dissenting).
49. 430 F. Supp. at 244-45 (Richardson, J.), 252 (Newman, J., concurring), 260-62 (Boe, J.,
concurring).
50. The Trade Act of 1974, ch. 3, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 1978 (1974), is the most recent enactment
pertaining to the countervailing duty provisions. See notes 28-45 supra and accompanying text for
the history of congressionally imposed countervailing duties.
51. 169 U.S. 16 (1898).
52. Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, §§ 14-15, 26 Stat. 131, 137-38.
53. 169 U.S. at 23.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 22-23.
57. T.D. 22984, 4 Treas. Dec. 405 (1901), aff'd, 113 F. 144 (4th Cir. 1902), aff'd, 187 U.S. 496
(1903).
58. Ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 205.
1977]
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regulate the production and control of domestic sugar. The Russian Govern-
ment, through a series of regulations, classified all sugar produced in Russia
as either (1) "free sugar"--sugar destined for domestic consumption, upon
which a tax of 1.75 rubles per pood"9 was levied, (2) "obligatory or indiverti-
ble reserve"-sugar held on reserve at the factory which could not be sold
without special permission of the government, and (3) "free reserve or free
surplus"--sugar produced in excess of the above two categories which could
not be sold domestically except upon payment of a double excise tax, or 3.5
rubles per pood. 60 If the sugar manufacturer exported sugar, he obtained an
"export certificate" which could be used to obtain the transfer of an equal
amount of sugar from the category of "free surplus" to "free sugar," which in
turn could be sold domestically at the tax rate of 1.75 rubles per pood. The
exported sugar was not taxed at all. Hence, the exporter not only avoided the
1.75 rubles per pood tax on all sugar he exported, but also received a
certificate worth 1.75 rubles, which was freely transferable and could be
applied to domestically sold "free sugar." The Board of General Appraisers
held that an exporter received two bounties for exporting-the direct bounty
on all sugar he exported and an indirect bounty consisting of the "export
certificate." '61 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 62
On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the maze of regulations that
constituted the Russian tax scheme in order to determine the economic effect
of the program on goods exported to the United States. Reasoning that the
language of the 1897 statute required the imposition of countervailing duties
whenever any type of bounty or grant was bestowed upon any dutiable
product-such as sugar-the Court relied upon Passavant63 and affirmed.
"When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted upon all
sugar exported, then, by whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under
whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty upon exportation. '64 Clearly, the
fundamental issue presented to the Court in Downs was the interpretation of
the statutory term "bounty." In resolving that issue, the Court had occasion to
take judicial notice of a determination reached by an 1898 conference of
European powers in Brussels which defined bounties as "all the advantages
conceded to manufacturers and refiners by the fiscal legislation of the States,
and that, directly or indirectly, are borne by the public treasury. ' 6s Downs
therefore stands for the principle that the remission, either direct or indirect,
of a tax upon exportation constitutes the conferral of a bounty or grant under
the United States countervailing duty laws. Almost immediately after its
promulgation, the Downs decision was cited by the Board of General Ap-
praisers for that very proposition. 66
59. The pood is a Russian measurement of weight equal to 36.113 pounds avoirdupois. 6 Law
& Pol'y Int'l Bus. 237, 243 (1974).
60. 187 U.S. at 504.
61. T.D. 22984, 4 Treas. Dec. at 413-14.
62. 113 F. at 144.
63. 187 U.S. at 502.
64. Id. at 515.
65. Id. at 501.
66. In re F.W. Meyers & Co., T.D. 24306, 6 Treas. Dec. 260, 264-65 (1903).
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The next major case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the then
existing countervailing duty law67 was G. S. Nicholas & Co. v. United
States.68 The controversy in that case concerned a British statute69 that
subjected all potable spirits distilled and sold in the United Kingdom to a
domestic revenue tax of'14s. 9d. per proof gallon.7 0 Exporters, however, were
not only exempted from the domestic tax, but in addition, were paid an
allowance from the public treasury of 3d. per gallon for pure spirits and 5d.
per gallon for compounded spirits.7 1 The statute as originally enacted indi-
cated that the allowance was to serve as compensation to manufacturers and
distillers, whether or not they exported, for the added cost and hindrance
created by the "excise regulations in the distillation and rectification of spirits
in the United Kingdom. '72 However, amendments to the statute7 3 provided
that the allowance was to be paid, to the manufacturer or distiller, only if he
was an exporter as well. 74 The result of the amendment was to grant a
remedial allowance to exporters, while depriving the manufacturers and
distillers who did not export of this benefit.75
The Court of Customs Appeals considered that the statute gave un-
equivocal aid or advantage to British exporters of spirits so that their goods
could be sold for less in competition with similar goods on the world
market.76 The court reasoned that it must look to the net effect of a foreign
scheme to determine the economic ramifications upon American industry." In
order for countervailing duties to attach, the court argued, it was not
necessary to inquire into the motives of a foreign government in subsidizing
exportation; subsidization of all producers, when coupled with the remission
of excise taxes upon exportation mandates the imposition of countervailing
duties.78
In Nicholas the issue was, in fact, not one of subsidization at all, but rather
of the final effect of remission of, or exemption from excise taxes. The
Supreme Court, in recognition of that fact, centered its attention upon the net
result of the British statute: "[T]he sale of spirits to other countries is relieved
67. Ch. 16, § IV, 38 Stat. 193.
68. T.D. 35595, 29 Treas. Dec. 59 (1915), affid, 7 CL Cust. App. 97 (1916), aff'd, 249 U.S. 34
(1919).
69. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1860, 23 & 24 Vict., c. 129, §§ 1, 4.
70. 7 Ct. Cust. App. at 103-04.
71. Id. at 98.
72. Id. at 99.
73. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 20, § 1(1); Supreme Court of
Judicature Act, 1902, 2 Edw. 7, c. 7, § 5; Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1895, 58 & 59 Vict.,
c. 16, §§ 6 & 7; Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 5(1), § 3; Supreme
Court of Judicature Act, 1880, 43 § 44 Vict., c. 24, §§ 13, 45, 49, 50, 54, 57, 62, 63, 72, 75,
79-83, 95, 117, 123; Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 98, § 12; see 7 Ct.
Cust. App. at 99-104.
74. 7 Ct. Cust. App. at 103.
75. Id. at 107-08.
76. Id. at 106.
77. Id. at 107.
78. Id. at 113-14.
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from a burden that their sale in the United Kingdom must bear. There is a
benefit, therefore, in exportation, an inducement to seek the foreign mar-
ket."' 79 In order to compensate for such a benefit, countervailing duties were
ordered.80
More recently, in American Express Co. v. United States the Customs
Court held, and the C.C.P.A. affirmed, 8 ' that Italy's practice of refunding
"basic rate taxes" 82 levied on electronic transmission tower components to
manufacturers who exported such products constituted a bounty or grant
within the meaning of section 303. The court reached this conclusion even
though the rebate involved remission of "hidden" or indirect taxes;83 that is,
there was no direct relationship between the rebated taxes and the exported
tower units.8 4 American Express established the principle that, in the broad
sense, all taxes paid by a producer are passed forward to the consumer.8 5
Hence, consideration of both direct and indirect taxes should be pertinent in
determining whether a remission thereof upon exportation constitutes a
bounty or grant within the meaning of section 303. It should be noted that the
decision in this case was based upon a tax remission, and that no additional
factors were present such as the export certificate in Downs8 6 or the allowance
79. 249 U.S. at 37. It is interesting to note that the Court, in so affirming, explicitly relied
upon the prior decisions of Passavant and Downs. Id. at 40-41.
80. Id. at 41.
81. T.D. 67-102, 1 Cust. B. & Dec. 212 (1967), aft'd, 332 F. Supp. 191 (Cust. Ct. 1971), qff'd,
472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973). See generally 7 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 235 (1973).
82. The "basic rate taxes" were levied pursuant to Italian Law No. 639. 332 F. Supp. at
195-96. The remitted taxes can be broken down into the following categories: "(1) customs duties
and other imports charges, (2) registration taxes, (3) stamp taxes, (4) stamp taxes on transporta-
tion documents, (5) insurance taxes, (6) mortgage taxes, (7) advertising and publicity taxes, (8)
government licenses and authorizations, (9) taxes for registration of motor vehicles, (10) surtaxes
on the above." Id.
83. "In international parlance [such taxes are deemed] 'taxe occulte.' " 472 F.2d at 1058.
84. "Stamp taxes required upon the purchase of the plant and equipment and taxes on
mortgages on real property, examples of the hidden taxes involved here, are not directly related to
the steel tower units. The effect of the rebate based on them on home market and export charges
for the units cannot be ascertained in the same comparatively straightforward manner as rebates
of ordinary excise taxes." Id.
85. Id.
86. See notes 57-66 supra and accompanying text. The contention was made that the
Treasury Department's ability to make countervailing duty determinations was nugatory "be-
cause its promulgation constituted a rule-making activity within the purview of the APA
[Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970)] that was carried out 'without
compliance with the procedural requirements of ... [that Act] and of the Customs Regulations.' "
472 F.2d at 1055. The C.C.P.A. disagreed, stating that decisions under § 303 of the Tariff Act of
1930 were not rulemaking under the APA. Id. at 1055-56. "While this conclusion went to the
nature of Treasury's decision, it did not address the issue of decisional process, and what
discretion, if any, there was available to the Secretary. The court did, however, make a finding
on this point, stating that 'an investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of a
bounty is in the nature of afact-finding activity rather than rule-making.' "Countervoilihig Duty
Law, supra note 16, at 851-52 (emphasis in original).
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in Nicholas. 7 Hence, the facts of American Express are indeed similar to
those in Zenith, and provide support for the notion that a pure tax remission
may constitute a bounty or grant.
It was against this background that the C.C.P.A. rendered its decision in
Zenith. The majority held that the remission by the Japanese government of
the commodity tax did not constitute a bounty or grant within the meaning of
section 303. 88 The court first addressed the prior case history which did not
permit conclusive characterization of a mere tax remission as a bounty or
grant. The court held that the Downs89 decision was not controlling because
the "bounty" in that case was essentially bipartite; that is, it involved both a
remission of tax and the issuance of an export certificate. Accordingly, the
Downs decision was based on the effect of the entire Russian scheme, rather
than on the separate impact of any one element. Hence, the C.C.P.A.
concluded that any language in Downs which purportedly established either a
tax remission or the issuance of an export certificate as sufficient ground,
standing alone, for the imposition of countervailing duties, was dictum and
not binding.90 The C.C.P.A. also stated that in all other cases dealing with
the remission of excise taxes, the bounties involved in each consisted of
something more than the mere remission of excise taxes. 91
From analysis of the legislative history of section 303, the court concluded
that the consecutive reenactment of countervailing duty statutes since 189092
had left the terms "bounty or grant" and "net amount" intentionally undefined
in order to permit a more flexible application of the statute. 93 Further, the
C.C.P.A. found that the repeated reenactment of section 303 by Congress
since 1890 did not necessarily imply congressional approbation of the judicial
analysis contained in Downs or its progeny.94 The court stated that it was
uncertain how Congress interpreted Downs, or even if Congress had been
adequately apprised of the scope and ramifications of the existing judicial
decisions on the issue of what constituted a bounty or grant within the
countervailing duty statute. 9 5 Consequently, the court reasoned that the
theory of implied ratification by Congress of judicial interpretation upon
reenactment of a statute could not be applied. 96 In the absence of both
controlling judicial precedent and of illuminating legislative history, the court
87. See notes 67-80 supra and accompanying text.
88. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 24.
89. See notes 57-66 supra and accompanying text.
90. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 13.
91. Id. at 14 n. 12. American Express and Nicholas were summarily dismissed in a footnote. Id.
92. See notes 28-45 supra and accompanying text.
93. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 16-17.
94. It is to be noted that the C.C.P.A. did not feel it necessary to reach the issue of legislative
history because it felt that Downs was not controlling. However, the court stated that if
arguendo Downs were to be considered, the theory of congressional ratification would not apply.
Id. at 17.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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turned to the "long-continued" 97 administrative practice of the Treasury
Department, whereby it uniformly refused to impose countervailing duties
when the mere remission of excise taxes by a foreign government was at
issue. 98
The dissent in the C.C.P.A. agreed with the unanimous Customs Court
below and concluded that the remission of the Japanese Commodity Tax did
constitute a bounty or grant within the meaning of section 303 and that
consequently the imposition of countervailing duties was required by stat-
ute. 99 The dissent argued that the majority had decided Zenith on the factual
basis of the "net amount" of benefits conferred upon Japanese manufacturers
who sell consumer electronic goods in the United States.10 0 However, Zenith
was before the C.C.P.A. on appeal and, said the dissent, the question
presented should be whether the remission of a nonexcessive excise tax, as a
matter of law, constitutes a bounty or grant within section 303.101 In the
view of the dissenters, the majority had erroneously concentrated on the
economic impact of the Japanese Commodity Tax remission. 10 2 The absence
of a factual determination by the court below undermined the legitimacy of
the majority's approach. All that was shown in the record was the Secretary
of the Treasury's Preliminary 10 3 and Final Determinations, 10 4 which dealt
specifically with three programs, none of which encompassed the commodity
tax at issue.1-s That tax was instead reached by resort to a general catch-all
paragraph added to the Determinations. 10 6 It was therefore clear that the
Secretary of the Treasury had made no economic determination concerning
the Japanese Commodity Tax, not even that the benefits were de minimis, 10 7
as was the case with the three other programs. The dissent submitted that if
the majority must characterize the issue in Zenith as one of factual economic
result, Zenith should at least be remanded for a more complete exposition of
the facts.' 0 8
The majority's contention that the Supreme Court in Downs had based its
97. Id. at 19.
98. King, supra note 37, at 1181. See generally note 37 supra and accompanying text.
99. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 26-27 (Miller, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 26 (Miller, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 26-27 (Miller, J., dissenting). It is easy to argue both sides on the issue whether the
majority of the C.C.P.A. in Zenith decided the issue as a matter of law or fact. The decision in
Zenith can, for example, be seen as affirming the principle that all remissions of nonexcessive
indirect taxes are not a bounty or grant within the meaning of § 303, as a matter of law. It may
also be interpreted as holding that the particular Japanese scheme in question did constitute a
bounty or grant although such bounty or grant was de minimis. The possibility of alternative
interpretations is unfortunate.
102. Id. at 26 (Miller, J., dissenting).
103. See notes 7-12 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 13-15 supia and accompanying text.
105. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
108. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 27 n.6 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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decision on the combined effects of the two inseparable parts of the bounty
bestowed by the Russian tax scheme was also rejected by the dissent.' °9
There was language in Downs, the dissent argued, to the effect that either the
remission of the excise tax or the issuance of an export certificate was
sufficient to support the holding in the case."10 The Zenith dissenters did not
consider this dictum. It supported its position by stressing that the Downs
Court had referred to the certificate as an "additional bounty":
If the additional bounty paid by Russia upon exported sugar were the result of a higher
protective tariff upon foreign sugar, and a further enhancement of prices by a
limitation of the amount of free sugar put upon the market, we should regard the effect
of such regulations as being simply a bounty upon production, although it might
incidentally and remotely foster an increased exportation of sugar, but where in
addition to that these regulations exempt sugar exported from excise taxation al-
together, we think it clearly falls within the definition of an indirect bounty upon
exportation. "'
The dissent asserted, moreover, that the majority had misconstrued the role
of the judiciary by ignoring the Supreme Court's own recognition of Downs'
precedential value" 2 and by following instead the contrary administrative
practices of the Treasury Department."13 Finally, the dissent felt that the
majority had erroneously underestimated Congress by stating that it may
have been ill apprised of existing judicial pronouncements when reenacting
the countervailing duty statute." 4
109. Id. at 29 (Miller, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 31 (Miller, J., dissenting). Many cases have held that "where a decision rests on
two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum." Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949); accord, Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S.
611, 623 (1948); Richmond Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 340 (1928).
111. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 30 (Miller, J., dissenting) (quoting Downs v. United States,
T.D. 22984, 4 Treas. Dec. 405 (1901), aff'd, 113 F. 144 (4th Cir. 1902), aff'd, 187 U.S. 496 (1903)
(emphasis supplied by C.C.P.A.)).
112. Id. at 32 (Miller, J., dissenting) (citing G.S. Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S.
34 (1919)).
113. Id. at 34 (Miller, J., dissenting). The dissent in the C.C.P.A. argued for the proposition
that when administrative practice and judicial pronouncements are in conflict and the question
presented is whether the Congress followed the former or the latter, "it is the latter authoritative
decision which the Congress must be presumed to have followed rather than the administrative
practice." Id. at 34-35 (Miller, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v.
Douglas & Berry, T.D. 35342, 6 Ct. Cust. App. 100 (1915)). "The fact that the executive branch
does not follow the interpretation of a law by the judicial branch does not render that
interpretation any less the law." Id. at 35 (Miller, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 35-38 (Miller, J., dissenting); see notes 28-46 supra and accompanying text. The
dissent in the C.C.P.A. also addressed the issue of the effective date of the countervailing duty
order issued by the Customs Court below. Only those goods entered for consumption after the
date of publication of a Customs Court's decision are subject to countervailing duties. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516(g) (Supp. V 1975). The issue presented to the court was whether there was -publication"
upon the entry of the Customs Court's decision. Brief for Appellant at 63, United States v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 6 (C.C.P.A. 1977). The dissent stated that
"publication" was effected on the day after the Customs Court's decision was published in the
19771
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Beyond the evaluation made by the dissent of the Zenith opinion, the
C.C.P.A. majority may be further chastized for quoting language in Downs
relating to the remission of the Russian excise tax in vacuo. The majority, in
criticizing the court below, specifically stated that language must always be
understood in context, and that the lower court had failed in this regard.115
However, the C.C.P.A. itself is susceptible to the same criticism.' 16 With the
obvious intent to maximize the importance of the export certificate at the
expense of the remission of the excise tax, the C.C.P.A., in quoting from
Downs, "17 stopped short before reaching the Supreme Court's declaration in
reference to a similar case. I s The Court had explicitly stated that "it was the
fact alone of the remission of the excise tax by the Dutch government which
brought into operation the bounty . . . ." 19 Clearly, the Supreme Court in
Downs cast the export certificate aspect of the Russian scheme in a subordi-
nate role. The Court's analysis of the certificate in fact depended upon a prior
determination that the remission of the excise tax was a "bounty on exporta-
tion.' 20 Hence, Downs supports the proposition that the mere nonexcessive
remission of an excise tax mandates, as a matter of law, the imposition of
countervailing duties. This was the only question presented to the C.C.P.A.
in Zenith. Based on its limited reading of Downs,' 2' coupled with the
observation that Congress, since 1890, had intentionally elected to refrain
Customs Bulletin, and that it would so modify the order below. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at
41-42 (Miller, J., dissenting).
115. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 10.
116. Id. at 11.
117. Id.
118. In United States v. Hills Bros. Co., 107 F. 107 (2nd Cir. 1901), additional duties were
exacted on certain sugar imports from Holland under the 1897 countervailing duty statute. See
notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text. The Dutch scheme levied a tax on all sugar imported
or raised for consumption in Holland and paid a bounty out of the Treasury for all domestic
production of sugar. If sugar was exported, the manufacturer was exempted from the excise tax;
yet he nonetheless received the production bounty from the government. Clearly, the effect of this
scheme was the bestowal of a bounty or grant upon the exporting manufacturer of sugar in the
form of a remission of, or exemption from, the excise tax. The court held that the levying of a
countervailing duty was in order. 107 F. at 108-09.
119. Downs v. United States, T.D. 22984, 4 Treas. Dec. 405, 413 (1901), aff'd, 113 F. 144
(4th Cir. 1902), aff'd, 187 U.S. 496 (1903) (emphasis added). While the C.C.P.A. was able to
distinguish Downs, it did not deem it necessary to distinguish Nicholas. Nicholas, however, Is
clearly distinguishable by recourse to the carefully delineated opinions below. The Board of
General Appraisers stated: "In levying the countervailing duty ... the collector has treated only
the allowance of 3d. and 5d. per gallon as a bounty or grant. . . . We are not entirely certain that
this takes the excise tax out of the provisions of [the Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IV, para. E, 38
Stat. 114, 193-94], but as the question is not before us we leave it undecided." G.S. Nicholas &
Co. v. United States, T.D. 35595, 29 Treas. Dec. 59, 65 (1915), aft'd, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 97 (1916),
aft'd, 249 U.S. 34 (1919). The Court of Customs Appeals similarly stated: "It must be borne in
mind that this appeal concerns only the 'allowance' paid to exporters ... and not the excise duty
. . . which latter is never paid upon spirits exported from the United Kingdom of Great Britain.
The status of the latter is not here in question." 7 Ct. Cust. App. at 104.
120. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 30 (Miller, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 9-14.
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from defining the terms "net amount," "bounty" and "grant,"' 22 the
C.C.P.A. stated that Zenith was a case of first impression.' 2 3 Although, it
may be true that Congress chose to leave those key words of the statute
undefined, the court's characterization of Zenith as a case of first impression
ignores the interpretative function of the judiciary. 124 While the majority may
have wished to avoid the conclusion that Congress had implicitly adopted the
judicial pronouncements made in Downs and its progeny by reenacting the
statute, 25 it should not have ignored the fact that Congress had explicitly
rejected proposals made in 1950126 and 1951127 which would have excluded
from the scope of the countervailing duty law a foreign government's exemp-
tion from, or remission of, taxes on goods exported to the United States.12 8
Indeed, the Customs Court in Zenith had stated:
It is apparent, then, that Congress could have, but declined to nullify the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the countervailing duty statute insofar as tax remissions are
concerned. A reasonable conclusion from the congressional rejection of the Treasury's
proposed amendments in 1950 and 1951 is that Congress was satisfied with the way it
had earlier written the statute, and approved of the Supreme Court's construction of
the law. 129
A related issue is whether Congress was aware of the Treasury Depart-
ment's construction of the law in this area and the weight that should be
attached to such an administrative practice. Since the enactment of the first
countervailing duty law, the Treasury Department has been responsible for
making the initial determination as to whether countervailing duties should be
imposed.' 30 The majority in Zenith attached great importance to the fact that
the Treasury Department has "consistently and uniformly" 13 1 interpreted the
statutory countervailing duty language to require more than the mere remis-
sion of excise taxes to constitute a bounty or grant.
132
122. Id. at 16-17.
123. Id. at 14.
124. Mlarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
125. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 17-18.
126. 430 F. Supp. at 253 (Newman, J., concurring) (citing the proposed Customs Simplifica-
tion Act of 1950, H.R. No. 8304, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.). The bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives on May 1, 1950, and was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. 96
Cong. Rec. 6,075 & 6,119 (1950). The bill died in committee. [ 1949-1950 Transfer Binder] Cong.
Index (CCI) 3,664.
127. 430 F. Supp. at 253 (Newman, J., concurring) (citing H.R. No. 5505, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-13 (1951)).
128. The proposed legislation provided inter alia: "The exemption of any exported article or
merchandise from a duty or tax imposed on like articles or merchandise when destined for
consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or the refunding of such a duty or tax, shall
not be deemed to constitute a payment or bestowal of a bounty or grant within the meaning of
this section." 430 F. Supp. at 254.
129. Id.
130. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
131. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 18; see notes 97-98 supro and accompanying text.
132. See notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text.
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A long-continued, uniform administrative practice, if not contrary to or inconsistent
with law, is entitled to great weight, particularly where, as here, those charged with its
administration adopted that practice contemporaneously with the inception of the
statute, and when Congress has repeatedly reenacted the statute without change, and
when Congress has failed to revise the statute in the face of such administrative
practice, and when Congress has refused requests to legislate a change. 133
There are, however, several inconsistencies in the court's analysis. First,
the fact that Congress in 1950 and again in 1951 refused to amend the
countervailing duty statute to conform to the practice of the Treasury
Department can hardly be construed as supportive of that administrative
practice. 134 It is difficult to understand how the majority could state, in light
of the 1950 and 1951 proposals, that it was certain "nothing in the voluminous
citations of record indicate[d] a congressional intent that countervailing duties
must be imposed in response to a nonexcessive remission of an excise tax
... 13 This statement becomes even more perplexing when one considers the
second lapse in the court's logic, viz. the fact that the court can make the
above statement in light of a 1970 Senate report 136 which stated, inter alia:
"The committee is also aware of the Supreme Court cases, and a recent
Customs Court case which has interpreted the words 'bounty' or 'grant' to
apply to virtually all subsidies, including the rebate of indirect taxes.'
13 7 It
can be presumed that the Congress was cognizant of the Senate Committee's
report of the judicial construction of the then existing statute. Yet, Congress
did not deem it advisable, or necessary, to exclude indirect nonexcessive tax
remissions from the scope of section 303. Persistent refusal to act in 1950,138
1951,139 1968,140 1970,141 1973142 and 1974 14- would seem adequate evi-
dence of a congressional rejection of the proposed exclusion of nonexcessive
remissions of excise taxes from the scope of section 303.144
133. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 19 (citations omitted).
134. See notes 126-129 supra and accompanying text.
135. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 16.
136. S. Rep. No. 91-1431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 278-81 (1970).
137. Id. at 281.
138. See notes 126-29 supra and accompanying text.
139. Id.
140. See 2 Compendium of Papers on Legislative Oversight of United States Trade Policies, S.
Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 475-76, 568-69, 887-89, 918-19 (1968).
141. See notes 136-137 supra and accompanying text.
142. The House Ways and Means Committee, when considering the Trade Act of 1974,
pointed out that it did not "express approval or disapproval of the standard employed by the
Treasury Department in administering the countervailing duty law with regard to the treatment
under that law of rebates or remissions of direct and indirect taxes." H.R. No. 571, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 69 (1973).
143. The Senate Finance Committee, when considering the Trade Act of 1974, similarly
refrained from approving the Treasury Department's practice in determining whether tax rebates
or remissions constitute bounties or grants within the scope of the countervailing duty law. S.
Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 172 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
7,186, 7,309.
144. "(C]ontinued re-enactment of a statute following its judicial interpretation (especially by
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The third flaw in the Zenith court's logic is its reliance on the principle that
a "long-continued" administrative practice is persuasive when not directly
contradicted by judicial decision. 14 - While this principle is persuasive, 46 it is
inapplicable here because Zenith was the first case' 47 presented for decision
pursuant to the court's expanded jurisdiction granted by the Trade Act of
1974.148 Therefore, it is nonjudicious to place "great weight" upon the
Treasury Department's "long-continued" interpretation of section 303 when,
for seventy-six of the past seventy-nine years, no judicial review existed to
challenge, question or overturn a negative countervailing duty determina-
tion. 149
It is certain that to impose countervailing duties in the Zenith case would
have serious ramifications in the political' 50 and economic"5 ' realms. To levy
the Supreme Court) creates a presumption of Congressional approval of that interpretation," I I
Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 34 (Miller, J., dissenting) (citing Shapiro v. United States, 335 U S. 1.
16 (1948); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 108 (1932); Hecht v. Malley, 265 US. 144, 153
(1924); Latimer v. United States, 223 U.S. 501, 504 (1912); Sessions v. Romadka. 145 U-S. 29, 42
(1892)).
145. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 19; see notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text
146. Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974).
147. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242. 250 (Cust. CL). rev'd. 1 i Cust.
B. & Dec. No. 33, at 6 (C.C.P.A. 1977); see notes 16 & 43 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
149. This is true because Hammond held that negative countervailing duty determinations
could not be appealed by Americans to the courts. Hence, one-half of all Treasury Department
determinations were incontestable. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
Although the C.C.P.A. did not discuss the significance of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), 61 Stat. All, A23, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1947), as amended
by 8 U.S.T. 1767, T.I.A.S. No. 3930, 278 U.N.T.S. 168 (1957) (the GATT was adopted by the
United States through executive agreement in 1947, 12 Fed. Reg. 8,863, Proclamation No. 267 1A
(1947)), the contention was made in the court below that the imposition of countervailing duties
in Zenith would be in direct conflict with article VI of the GATT. Article %I, when applied to
Zenith, expressly prohibits the imposition of countervailing duties unless it is shown that the
Japanese consumer electronic goods allegedly benefiting from the Japanese tax scheme threaten to
cause material injury to Zenith and the American electronic consumer goods industry. Since no
such showing was made, it is argued, the contractual obligations of the GATT are binding on the
United States. 430 F. Supp. at 248 n.S. This contention may be dismissed by recourse to the
Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which
provides that the GATT shall be applied to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing
legislation. 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1947). Since the provisions of
§ 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 were in full force at the time of contracting, the provisions of the
Protocol render article VI of the GATT inapplicable to the United States. The same conclusion
can be reached by recourse to the principle that when a treaty and a statute are irreconciliable,
the latter one in point of time must prevail. 5 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law § 489
(1927).
150. The C.C.P.A. in Hammond stated: "In the assessment of a countervailing duty, the
determination that a bounty or grant is paid necessarily involves judgments in the political,
legislative or policy spheres." 440 F.2d 1030. To this the C.C.P.A. added in Zenith that the
"eminently important economic sphere" must be considered as well. I 1 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33,
at 16.
151. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
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countervailing duties might pose a real threat to international political har-
mony.15 2 One commentator recently stated that the Zenith decision "was seen
by the Carter Administration as a major legad victory . . . [and that] the
Zenith case represented a serious threat to trade harmony and to the success
of trade-liberalization negotiations in Geneva.' 53 However, to refrain from
levying countervailing duties on the Japanese products endangers the Amer-
ican electronic consumer goods industry. 5 4 It has also been stated that
cheaper foreign manufacturing has already annihilated the United States
domestic black and white television industry. 55 The Zenith decision might
have a similar effect on the domestic color television industry. i s6 While a
negative countervailing duty determination poses a threat to the economic
well-being of the United States domestic television industry, a positive
countervailing duty determination jeopardizes global economic recovery from
the recent recession by raising the specter of protectionism. I7 To be sure, the
United States cannot remain "an island of prosperity in a sea of economic
troubles ... ."158
In response to this dilemma, the United States has negotiated' 5 9 an Orderly
Trade Agreement 60 with Japan which established fixed import levels for
television sets and parts during the next three years.' 6 ' While such executive
remedies to the politico-economic dilemma can only be effective in the
absence of judicially imposed countervailing duties, this does not call for
abdication by the C.C.P.A. of its responsibility to enforce the countervailing
duty laws and, in so doing, to follow the Supreme Court's decision in Downs.
However, it has been noted that since Downs "the world has seen two World
Wars, an industrial revolution, a scientific revolution, and a flight from Kitty
152. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1977, § D, at I, col. 1.
153. Id. § A, at 1, col. 4.
154. 178 N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1977, at 1, col. 4, continued at 3, col. 2. On September 28, 1977,
Zenith announced that because of "heavy imports" from Japan, it had been forced to lay off some
5,600 American workers in order to compete with the Japanese. Other American producers of
electronic consumer goods have been forced to take similar measures. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28,
1977, § D, at 1, col. 3.
155. 178 N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1977, at 1, col. 4, continued at 3, col. 2. Because of the high
level of competition attained by foreign manufacturers, the domestic black and white television
industry in the United States is virtually nonexistent. Id.
156. Id.
157. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 1.
158. Id. at col. 3 (quoting Ambassador Mike Mansfield). The assessment of countervailing
duties "is also one of the chips in a game played by governments on a world wide stage." 11
Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 16.
159. 42 Fed. Reg. 26, 195 (1977).
160. See generally Bernier, Les ententes de restriction volontaire C 'exportation en droit
international iconomique, 11 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 48 (1973). Statutory power for such Orderly
Trade Agreements is granted by tit. 1, ch. 1, § 105 of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. at 1,984, 19
U.S.C. § 2115 (Supp. V 1975).
161. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 4, continued § D, at 9, col. 1. The "import
level was fixed at 1.56 million complete sets and 190,000 partial sets a year for the next three
years." Id.
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Hawk to the moon." 62 Perhaps it is time for a reconsideration by the
Supreme Court of Downs and its progeny. The present state of the law
requires the imposition of countervailing duties despite the fact that such a
decision is at odds with the political and economic exigencies of today.
William W. Eggleston
162. 11 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 33, at 9.
